Syria’s Agenda for Accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013

Abstract

Syria’s decision to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2013 was a significant milestone in the dynamics of chemical weapons control amidst domestic armed conflict and great power rivalry. This article aims to analyze why Syria chose to join the CWC regime at a time of crisis, positioning the decision as a strategic state action, rather than as a consequence of normative compliance with international law. This research employs a qualitative method with a descriptive-analytical approach through a literature review of official United Nations documents, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) reports, and relevant academic literature. The analysis is conducted using a neorealist perspective that views the international regime as an instrument utilized by states in an anarchic international system. The results show that Syria’s accession to the CWC functioned as a bargaining strategy to respond to coercive pressure, particularly the threat of US military intervention following the Ghouta incident, while also shifting the chemical weapons issue from the realm of the threat of force to international institutional and procedural mechanisms. Furthermore, the accession strengthened Syria’s position within the multilateral framework by leveraging Russia’s political protection in the UN Security Council. These findings confirm that the effectiveness of international regimes such as the CWC is highly dependent on the configuration of power and support of major powers, making state compliance with the regime more strategic and conditional than normative.